In "Introspection: Part I," the included post included some reflections/memories of how it was that I left Gallaudet University in D.C. (October 2006) in order to return to Texas and care for my family. The reflection is set in 2007 when my family (mother and four younger brothers) had to relocate to San Antonio in order to get my grandmother cared for. I did not transfer to Baylor until August 2008. Some might consider the post overtly personal and unrelated to philosophy, but I would disagree.
When it comes to religion, there is a system of punishments and rewards. Though there are many exceptions, the overall consensus among religious followers is that good followers get rewarded and the bad followers get punished. Aristotle appears to touch on this question when he writes"…is it completely wrong to track a person's fortunes like this? For they are not where living well or badly is located, but rather human life needs them in addition, as we have said, and it is activities in accordance with excellence that are responsible for our happiness, and the opposite sort of activities for the opposite state" (106).
As Aristotle says,"..it does not make a small difference whether people are habituated to behave in one way or in another way from childhood on, but a very great one; or rather, it makes all the difference in the world." It seems to me that every person has their own philosophical milestones in which idealism needs to be reconciled with reality. When those mountains slap you in the face, you encounter that disillusionment that seems to resemble Plato's description of the light first hitting the faces of the cave-dwellers.
While there were other milestones, my larger questions relate to the problem of suffering. The branch offs seem to concern whether or not the rules of morality change in the event of extreme pain and suffering. While discussing The Diving Bell and the Butterfly, that rule concerning morality in suffering deeply disconcerted me. Both Kant and Aristotle call it immoral to commit suicide. Kant calls it immoral because humanity is supposed to be an end unto itself—life is to be cherished over death (essentially). Aristotle is similar in his articulations against suicide when he says: "and the most fearsome things is death; for it is an end, and there seems to be nothing any longer for the dead person that is either good or bad" (133).
To bring this back down to earth a little bit, during the Civil War the courts were shut down in some areas of the union that were under martial law. In Ex parte Milligan, the court argued that because the military was attempted during a time and place when the civil courts were open, the civil courts have jurisdiction over citizens. They did stipulate that if the country existed under a state of anarchy, traditional rules (the civil courts) would no longer apply because the necessary system that they are built on are unavailable. So apply that to morality. If a person or group of people have their entire system of morality crushed under the trials of pain and suffering, how is it rational to assume that the same moral approximations would still be valid?
That, dear readers and non-readers, is my question.
Aristotle mentions approximation: "Actions have to do with particulars, and the requirement is that we should be in accord on these. So we should take these cases, from the chart. Thus with regard to feelings of fear and boldness, courage is the intermediate state" (118).
Where is the courage? How do we really ascribe courage when it is only necessary when the rules change?
How does the statement below really work?
"But one should not be courageous because of constraint; one should be courageous because it is fine to be so." (pp 135)
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